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When is an assembly riotous, 
and who decides?
The success and failure of police attempts to 
criminalise protest
EALáIR ní dhoRChAIgh And LAUREnCE Cox•
This chapter explores the sensitive topic of police violence at po-
litical protests in Ireland in more recent times and in particular 
the question of when and how it is legitimised. Long experience 
of discussing the matter with students, colleagues, journalists and 
members of the public makes it clear that many people see police 
acts using force as per se legitimate and therefore not ‘violent’, a 
term thus reserved for illegitimate acts. Yet police behaviour can 
be contested publicly and on occasion found to be illegitimate 
(by expert opinion, by media commentators, by internal inquiries 
or indeed by courts of law). The question of how the use of force 
is legitimised – and what conditions make this achievement of 
legitimacy more or less likely – is then an interesting one, as is the 
broader question of why a police decision is made to use force in 
the first place, and at what level.
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Thus a central theme of our chapter is the need to separate 
acts involving force (injury to civilians on Dublin’s Dame Street, 
for example) from the question of whether or not they are 
subsequently legitimised (in the case of Dame Street in 2002 they 
were not; in the case of Rossport in Mayo in the years up to 2010 
they consistently have been). In the contexts in question, police 
acts of force – far from being seen as automatically legitimate – 
have been widely condemned in the media and, on occasion, by 
internal inquiries; they have also been denied (rarely) or ignored 
(far more commonly), and (on occasion) explicitly justified.
Our general argument here is that (a) police officers commit 
violent acts, but are (sometimes) licensed to do so; (b) the question 
of when they are licensed to do so is an interesting one and worthy 
of research; (c) it has to do with a range of social actors, notably the 
media, courts and politicians; (d) all of this is separate again from 
the question of whether in some other sense they are justified or 
not, on which opinions will no doubt continue to differ.
A separate question centres on why particular acts of police 
violence are committed. A particular act may originate with a 
strategic decision by senior police management (or indeed a general 
directive by politicians); it may also be a decision by the immediate 
commander or it may indeed represent a loss of ‘command and 
control’ over individual officers. Given that some policing decisions 
will never be recorded, and others will be fully discoverable only in 
the event of independent legal inquiries or the subsequent release 
of state papers, a whole series of problems arise.
In this context, researchers have to draw on the available 
evidence and make reasonable arguments about (i) when genuine 
choices are being made – as with the ‘no-arrests’ policy, which was 
publicly stated in Garda Review, or the withdrawal of batons from 
front-line police at protests, visible between May and September 
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2002; (ii) at what level such choices are made – for example, the 
involvement of the navy in responding to the Erris protests and 
the borrowing of water cannon from the PSNI for the May Day 
protests were clearly not decisions within the remit of junior 
officers; and (iii) what explanations for such decisions can plausibly 
be suggested.
In other words, as citizens or (sociological) researchers, we have 
to do the best we can to understand why, when citizens protest, 
they are occasionally attacked (legitimately or not), though we 
remain aware that in some cases we may never know the answer. 
Comparable limitations, of course, apply to events in the past, 
where the data is also limited (albeit differently) and researchers 
also need to rely on chains of evidence, assumptions and reasoning 
to make convincing arguments about the reasons for particular 
acts.
Here we discuss some choices in the recent policing of protest 
in the republic, and possible explanations for these choices; we 
also ask about the processes through which the outcomes of 
such choices – in terms of the use of particular levels of violence 
against citizens – have been found legitimate or otherwise, and the 
conditions which influence these outcomes. We start, however, in 
the eighteenth century.
In 1787, Irish law introduced the ‘reading of the Riot Act’. In 
this ritual, once the act was read, a popular gathering – irrespective 
of the participants’ actions – became illegal, and subject to physical 
attack by the authorities. Similar ‘warnings to disperse’ are still 
employed by the Irish police at demonstrations in Ireland today, and 
the charge of ‘refusal to obey the instructions of a garda’ is routinely 
brought against protestors, whereas the 1994 Criminal Justice Act 
makes ‘riot’ an offence in itself, separate from any specific actions. In 
other words, if the police publicly define protests or other collective 
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actions as riotous, they are entitled to make extensive use of force 
in repressing them, and both participation and mere physical 
presence become criminal. Another way of describing such laws is 
to say that an assembly is riotous when the authorities say that it 
is. Such statements are what Jürgen Habermas calls ‘performative 
utterances’, statements which make something real by saying that 
it is so, like ‘I do’ at a wedding.1 The implication is that the state can 
legitimate its use of violence against social movements, restrict the 
freedom of assembly and criminalise participants just by saying so.
However, police decisions to define a specific protest as 
illegitimate and illegal – and hence a legitimate target of violence – 
is not automatically the end of the matter. Protestors try, sometimes 
successfully, to undermine such decisions; and other social groups 
like the media and courts do not always give the consent needed to 
legitimise coercion. As the broad history of the popular assertion of 
political rights like the right of assembly suggests, the authorities’ 
routine attempts to restrict such rights often fail.
The key feature of all these events – as with the series of 
simultaneous protests around the use of Shannon Airport by the US 
military, which deserve separate discussion – is their combination 
of peaceful protest with disruptive tactics (non-violent direct 
action) and a consequent refusal to negotiate protest events in 
advance with the police. This disruptive power is one of the major 
tools that those who are formally powerless have at their disposal.2 
Struggle over the legitimacy of such action is therefore a key site of 
political conflict. It is also important that we are discussing events 
which broadly fit within the ‘alter-globalisation’ (anti-capitalist, 
global justice, etc.) movement; policing strategies are very different 
in relation to different movements.3 Our analysis leads us to ask 
three further questions:
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•	 Why should police seek to criminalise the alter-globalisation 
movement in the first place?
•	 What conditions enable or prevent legitimation of the use of 
force by the police?
•	 What do police and protestors learn from these events?
Considering its origins, the Republic of Ireland is a remarkably 
peaceful state, as shown by international comparisons of murder 
rates or the availability and use of weapons, official and unoffi-
cial. This is tied to the successful pacification of the state dur-
ing the post-Treaty ‘counter-revolution’ and more recently to the 
Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’, which have had a massive impact on 
political violence in the republic. The key security institutions of 
the state have – or at least had until the Good Friday agreement 
of 1998 – been justified by the Northern Ireland conflict (and by 
extension the supposed subversive threat to state power in the re-
public), to which they have directed most of their attention, with 
the support of most political forces and media in the south.
One major implication of this preoccupation was a sharp 
division in policing style for protest in the republic in the last 
third of the twentieth century. ‘Routine’ political demonstrations 
of whatever colour were (until 2000) essentially self-policing, with 
very low police presence and organisers determined that their 
protest should be fundamentally non-disruptive, in contrast to the 
routinely tolerated disruptive protests by insider interest groups 
like farmers and taxi drivers. Conversely, other kinds of political 
protest – notably republican events, but also working-class and 
Traveller protest, and rural protests against the development plans 
of multinational corporations – were met with a massive and 
coercive police presence as a matter of course.
Political riots have been rare in the republic’s recent history. 
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After the ‘Bloody Sunday’ killings of protestors by soldiers in 
Derry in 1972, a crowd set fire to the British embassy in Dublin. 
It was again a target during the 1981 hunger strikes, but this time 
the crowd of 15,000 met a brutal response. This zero-tolerance 
security operation is seen as a watershed in Irish policing history.4 
Conversely, non-political collective violence on a small scale 
has long been a fairly routine feature of Irish life. For example, 
at the time of the 2004 EU summit protests in Dublin (twenty-
nine arrests, but only half reached trial), the ‘Rally of the Lakes’ 
resulted in forty-three arrests in Killarney,5 where one incident was 
reported thus:
Officers were targeted by thugs when they arrived at the scene of a 
fight at the busy junction linking Main Street and Plunkett Street 
at 1.30 a.m.
As they moved in to apprehend two culprits, other bystanders 
got involved and Gardaí were targeted with missiles when reinforce-
ments arrived to break up the row. ‘It was basically the crowd that 
couldn’t get into the nightclubs that had congregated on the street 
– these were people who had come out of the pub and couldn’t get in 
anywhere,’ Sergeant Tom Tobin told The Kingdom.
Around 300 people were present at the scene as Gardaí broke up 
the fight. Seven people were arrested under the Public Order Act as a 
result of the fracas, making up a quarter of the 28 public order arrests 
made on Saturday night and Sunday morning. Nobody was injured 
as a result of the street fight and those arrested will be brought before 
the courts.6
The contrast between the policing of the Killarney event and that 
of the EU protest, for which over half the republic’s police force 
was deployed, is stark.
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Similar conflicts at Traveller weddings and funerals have been 
a feature of life in the republic, and routinely provoke a ‘moral 
panic’ in the media as well as intensive policing. Yet another kind 
of response marks the frequent encounters between police and 
groups of youths on council estates in west Dublin and elsewhere, 
which are typically occasions for the deployment of state force but 
without any media fanfare. Such ‘social violence’ took an explicitly 
political form in 2006, with the so-called ‘Dublin riots’ in which 
an apparently spontaneous gathering of marginalised working-
class youth prevented the loyalist Love Ulster organisation 
from marching past the GPO. This event highlighted both the 
organisational capacity of those involved and the separation 
of their networks from those of traditional republicanism: both 
republicans and the police were caught by surprise.7 This event, 
however, stands out as exceptional, and is best understood as a 
transposition to the city centre of normally hidden conflicts on 
peripheral estates.
Despite this peaceful history, the alleged likelihood of anti-
capitalist violence has frequently resulted in high-scale policing 
of protest, justified by implausible information fed to the media.8 
Equally interestingly, the co-operation of courts and media 
– routinely available to criminalise working-class youth and 
Travellers – has often been withheld. What is it about the alter-
globalisation movement that seems to make the Irish police want 
to criminalise it and yet makes their attempts to do so fall flat? By 
2002, senior Irish police officers were familiar with their European 
colleagues’ picture of alter-globalisation protestors as ‘the new 
subversive threat’, a perspective highlighted in 2001 by the near-
fatal shooting of three protestors in Gothenburg and the killing of 
one in Genoa. Dublin’s ‘Reclaim the Streets’ (RTS) protests were 
equally international in inspiration and were by now traditional in 
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Dublin, highlighting the privatisation of public space by car traffic 
and disrupting it with street parties.
The 2002 street party began with about 400 people listening 
to music played from a rig blocking one of the city’s busiest roads. 
Banners against car culture and commodification of the city called 
for free public space. Numbers rose to 700 and the party continued 
for three hours until the police became hostile and began making 
arrests. Partygoers decided it would be safer to walk en masse to 
Stephen’s Green and disperse there but, as they began to move, an 
unmarked police car drove into the march, breaking it up. Several 
police vans arrived and participants alleged the gardaí started 
indiscriminately attacking people – partygoers, bystanders and 
passing shoppers. As police numbers rose to about 150, the crowd, 
now only 200, was still moving towards the park, but was blocked 
by police vans and bikes. One protestor recalled:
This was the worst of the baton charges I saw. Previously they had 
been happy taking a few swings at a couple of people to frighten 
people back. This time they were knocking people to the ground and 
continuing to baton and kick people once they had gone down. I saw 
a young man being thrown against the side of a bus and batoned 
there by at least five gardaí … One advertising executive reported 
that he had been hit three times before seeing two motorbike cops 
banging a young man’s head off a wall. A woman was knocked off 
her bike and beaten on the ground before being arrested, and many 
people were sent to hospital at this point.9
These events fitted into an increasing police hostility to alter-
globalisation activism. On European Car Free Day in September 
2001, a well-established and generally tolerated event in other 
EU states, five Dublin activists were arrested for obstructing traf-
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fic. Three weeks later a protest against privatisation was met by 
a baton charge, with fourteen protestors being arrested and held 
overnight – a then unprecedented measure in relation to minor 
public order disturbances. A journalist recording the event was ar-
rested and had his equipment confiscated. By the time the police 
attacked the Dame Street party, arresting twenty-four and hos-
pitalising over a dozen people, a pattern of aggressive policing of 
anti-capitalist movement activity had already emerged. The Irish 
Times journalist William Hederman commented:
Since last summer, there has been a remarkable shift in the garda’s 
approach to dealing with protests by the ‘anti-capitalist’ or ‘interna-
tionalist’ movement. Activists report that gardaí have been moving 
in suddenly and aggressively, making arrests and bringing criminal 
charges under the controversial Public Order Act (POA).10
Protestors also noted that the riot units that attacked the crowd 
were not wearing numbers, a serious breach of discipline if it had 
not been sanctioned by senior officers.
What marked this event out from previous incidents was the 
availability of high-quality video footage of the events and the 
willingness of national television to broadcast images of police 
violence, resulting in what is now widely seen as one of the 
major police legitimacy crises in recent Irish history.11 Uniquely, 
tabloid headlines the next day criticised the police rather than the 
protestors, and it became clear that the traditional licence accorded 
to students in particular to engage in unusual and colourful 
behaviour was widely accepted even among traditional, ‘middle-
class’ supporters of the gardaí. A crowd of almost 1,000 marched 
the following week to demonstrate against the treatment of RTS 
protestors, the marchers representing a broad mix of socialists, 
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anarchists, republicans and the travelling community.
There were serious repercussions for the police: over €1 
million was paid out in compensation to victims, while the Garda 
Complaints Board denounced the behaviour of the police involved 
in attacking the RTS protest. An internal inquiry was held (in 
which officers unanimously claimed not to be able to identify any of 
their colleagues as having taken part) and batons were taken away 
from the police at the next RTS demonstration, six months later. 
For their part, police participants in the September events held 
that they had been ‘hung out to dry’ by management. Plans to hold 
the European meeting of the World Economic Forum in Dublin 
the following year were scrapped after the Irish Social Forum and 
Grassroots Gathering mounted an anti-summit campaign. If, as 
activists believed, this represented an official acknowledgement 
of police inability to deal successfully with new kinds of protest, 
this was clearly a problem for the police (not to mention an 
embarrassment for senior politicians) and required a new strategy 
on their part, as well as a substantial investment in training.12 As 
an aside, we can observe that Dame Street was by 2010 closed to 
private transport and used only by buses and taxis.
Two years after the events of May Day 2002, Ireland was 
scheduled to hold an EU summit meeting in Dublin’s Phoenix 
Park. The old left used this opportunity to hold a conventional 
march against neo-liberalism in a location approved by the police, 
whereas the libertarian left established the ‘Dublin Grassroots 
Network’ and called for a march to the summit itself. Following 
the model of Argentinean cacerolazos, the aim was to ‘bring the 
noise’ – whistles, pots and pans – to discover whether dissenting 
citizens could in fact be heard by EU leaders. The key issues were 
opposition to what were seen as racist ‘Fortress Europe’ policies, 
the privatisation of basic services, neo-liberalism’s perceived 
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contribution to social injustice and the increased militarisation of 
the European Union.
Although May Day 2004 was officially framed as a ‘day of 
welcomes’, anticipatory media coverage of the summit protests – 
drawing on the usual unattributed ‘security sources’ – warned the 
Irish public that hordes of EU citizens were planning to travel across 
the Irish Sea to protest. Elsewhere in the EU, similar attempts by 
citizens to exercise the right to demonstrate have routinely been 
met with the suspension of the Schengen agreement, the detaining 
of protestors at frontiers and the systematic demonisation of 
‘foreign’ protestors. The Garda Representative Association claimed 
that everyone who had been in Genoa (some 250,000 according 
to standard estimates) would come to Ireland; another claimed 
that there were ‘20,000 anarchists’ travelling from the UK. Rather 
more accurately, the final Garda Review analysis suggested a 
figure of twenty visitors intent on causing trouble.13 The bizarre 
inflation of numbers seems to have been part of a disinformation 
campaign, which ran for months before the event, attacking alter-
globalisation demonstrations and aiming to legitimise militarised 
policing. Stories were leaked of secret armies, arms dumps, a 
threatened gas attack on the Taoiseach and plans to burn down 
Blanchardstown shopping centre; journalists wrote of infiltrating 
‘secret meetings’ which turned out to be publicly advertised and 
open to all.14 Aisling Reidy of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties 
said they were ‘very concerned that gardaí, through stories fed to 
the media, [were] trying to soften up public opinion for a show 
down, by talking of potential violence and well-planned attacks by 
subversives’.15
The summit’s location, close to a residential area, was marked 
off by a four-mile exclusion zone, with between 4,000 and 6,000 
police officers – half the national force – deployed on summit-
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related duties, 1,000 in riot squads. Overtly alarmist measures 
included the deployment of over 2,500 troops, the use of the navy 
and air corps, placing the army’s chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear unit on stand-by, detailing other troops to help gardaí 
secure key installations around the capital, including the airport, 
tightening immigration checks at ports and airports, cancelling 
all garda leave and borrowing water cannons from the Northern 
Ireland police, from whose tactics gardaí have historically preferred 
to dissociate themselves. More disturbingly, senior gardaí told 
hospitals to have their emergency contingency plans ready in case 
of serious civil unrest, space was cleared at the city morgue and 
body bags16 were said to have been ordered, a wing of a Dublin 
prison was emptied in readiness, and gardaí visited city-centre 
businesses warning of serious violence and encouraging them to 
shut up shop for the weekend, producing a frightened, silent and 
militarised city.17
The right to protest was directly suspended with the 
announcement, two days before the protest, that the riot squad 
would be deployed at the march’s starting point with orders 
to break up any attempt to assemble – a serious threat to those 
who might not hear of this in time. In the face of this, and the 
usual anonymous announcements in the media that the protest 
had been cancelled, Dublin Grassroots Network declared a new 
starting point. The eventual march brought 5,000 marchers within 
a mile of the summit venue, well inside the supposed inclusion 
zone, and safely back to the city centre, a distance of some eight or 
nine miles. In the confrontation at Phoenix Park’s Ashtown gate 
between some protestors and police, the apparently overwhelming 
force available to police was restrained in the face of a massive 
media presence, legal observers, memories of 2002 and the 
presence of large numbers of interested local working-class men 
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on a warm Saturday evening. An attempt by a group of protestors 
to push through police lines was met with the use of water cannon, 
producing a stalemate, and protestors retreated in good order in 
the face of baton charges.
Police strategies were also less than successful in the public 
arena. Banning the march almost certainly boosted the number 
of protestors who were defending the freedom to protest. Serious 
media used the more ludicrous claims fed to journalists to mock the 
alarmism of the tabloid press. Journalist Harry Browne commented 
that the event was ‘actually a garda riot control operation without 
a riot … and the virtual erasure of people who were involved in 
peaceful protest in a public place and were subjected to assault by 
baton and cold bath, then arrest by gardaí’. The denial of bail to 
the handful of protestors arrested (usually on trivial charges, and 
held over the bank holiday weekend) was the subject of newspaper 
editorials and it was rapidly reversed.18
Far from the organisers being charged with conspiracy to 
organise a riot, as would have been logical if the police had 
believed their own claims, only trivial charges were brought (most 
for ‘breach of the peace’ and ‘refusal to obey the instructions of a 
garda’). The courts refused to entertain police requests to take into 
account the political context of the supposed offences. The most 
serious charge (of possessing stencils) was thrown out because the 
police had failed to bring any evidence to show their purpose.19 We 
may note that four years later the Irish electorate rejected the EU’s 
Lisbon Treaty and was ‘sent back’ the next year to vote again until 
the officially approved result was achieved.
The year after the EU protest, five men from an isolated rural 
community in north-west Ireland were gaoled for refusing to comply 
with an injunction against interference with Shell’s plans, using the 
first compulsory purchase orders awarded to a private company in 
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the history of the state, to construct a gas pipeline on their land. 
Local residents, supporters and much expert opinion considered 
the experimental pipeline and refinery to pose a significant danger. 
After years of organising, local people resorted in 2005 to civil 
disobedience in a desperate attempt to halt the development. They 
picketed the gates of the refinery construction site on the day of 
the gaoling, preventing any work from taking place. Following the 
imprisonments, a major national and international mobilisation 
ensued in support of the locals, and Shell quickly changed tack, 
enabling their release and ending a serious PR disaster. The Shell 
to Sea campaign now came to be seen as an international example 
of local struggle against global capital.
In October 2006, the situation changed. Smears against the 
campaign were spread to the press, claiming that it had been 
hijacked by dissident republicans,20 and the policing operation 
changed. That month, the picket line which had been held for 
nearly a year and a half was violently broken by hundreds of police 
who were brought into the area and remained there for the next 
couple of years. In an interview Superintendent Gannon explained 
the changed strategy: 
The entrance to the site was blocked for a year and a half. Local 
people had a veto on who went in and out of the site: it was out of 
this situation that the current operation was born … There were no 
arrests. That was part of our strategy: we did not want to facilitate 
anyone down there with a route to martyrdom. That has been the 
policy ever since.21
The net result of this ‘no arrests’ policy was the use of police vio-
lence rather than risking the uncertain support of the courts and 
media. It clearly followed from the major mobilising effect of the 
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imprisonment of the Rossport Five, which drew criticism from 
many quarters in Irish society. Other elements of the new policy 
evidently included the targeted use of off-camera violence and the 
intimidation of individuals through intense surveillance and har-
assment – this, however, was counter-productive, in that the local 
residents who were the main victims became more, rather than 
less, committed to their protests. The situation was intensified by 
the appearance of groups of masked individuals who hospitalised 
one local fisherman and sank his boat; it is hard to imagine this 
could go unnoticed by the massive police presence. Ironically, 
following the end of the ‘no-arrests’ policy, this same fisherman 
found himself targeted for imprisonment.22
The period of no arrests, but off-camera violence, ended in 2009. 
Though a full clarification of this strategy must await the release 
of state papers, the ending of the ‘no-arrests’ policy and the use of 
the military can hardly have been within the discretion of local 
commanders, and presumably represented a decision that the time 
had come to force the pipeline through at any cost. To this end, a 
substantial part of the Irish navy was brought in to protect the ship 
laying the pipeline. Fishing boats and kayaks had previously been 
used to prevent this; now there were targeted arrests of protestors 
with access to these skills and equipment. Leading protestors were 
given severe sentences, and a local judge even required a psychiatric 
examination of one protestor. When the mass arrests of less high-
profile campaigners were brought before higher courts, however, 
twenty-five out of twenty-seven people had their cases withdrawn 
or dismissed, with criticism both of the local judge’s refusal of bail 
and of the unlawful detention of another activist; evidently the 
breach between police and courts was not so easily mended.23
In this new strategy, media attacks on protestors continued – 
no doubt reflecting the fact that much of the broadcast and print 
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media is owned either by the state or by individuals with interests 
in offshore energy exploration. As before, most journalists assigned 
to the case were still crime reporters, reliant on the police for 
information. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that by 2010, some 
eleven years after the saga began, despite the best efforts of the 
police and corporations, planning permission had still not been 
granted for the onshore section of the pipeline. Let us now return 
to the three questions we asked earlier.
1. Why criminalise the alter-globalisation movement?
Police respond differently to different protest groups; and the 
treatment of campaigners involved in the anti-globalisation 
movement changed substantially around 2001–2. How should we 
understand this? Neo-liberal states reject on principle the kinds 
of investments and concessions needed to win popular consensus. 
This policy entails an attack on gains won by previous movements 
from below, including, importantly, political rights such as the 
right to protest or to exercise control over government policy.24 
This thus marks a shift from consent to coercion.
From this perspective, it is no coincidence that at this point in 
history a global anti-capitalist movement should develop, with a 
critical approach to state power and a willingness to adopt disruptive 
tactics as popular movements become increasingly distanced from 
decision-making; nor is it a surprise that these movements against 
neo-liberalism encountered an approach to policing protest that 
had not been seen since the early 1970s. The recent standard 
policing of transnational, alter-globalisation protest involves:
•	 The use of ‘less-lethal’ arms; databanks of ‘travelling 
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troublemakers’ have been constructed; special anti-
insurgent units have been created; and in some cases the 
military has also been deployed for public order tasks.25
•	 Even though this shift came from the executive arm of 
the state, it had to overturn previous norms in the media 
and courts. To this end, alter-globalisation protestors were 
branded as terrorists, by association with foreign ‘anarchists’ 
or dissident republicans. Just as, in the USA, the end of the 
Cold War created the need for a new campaign – the ‘war 
on drugs’ – to legitimate the neo-liberal increase in state 
coercion, so in Ireland the alter-globalisation movement 
was chosen, we suggest, to fill the same gap.26
2. What conditions enable or prevent legitimation of 
the use of force by the police?
The failure of the Irish establishment to legitimise the use of force 
on May Day 2002 can be explained in part by the use of activist 
media, and in particular the ability of activists to produce TV-
quality footage of police assaulting people who fitted popular im-
ages of ‘young, middle-class students’. While the Irish police had 
a clear idea that RTS needed to be beaten down, as anti-capitalist 
subversion and as a threat to the free flow of private traffic in 
Dublin, journalists did not agree that it was acceptable to use such 
force against these particular groups.
Gramsci writes that power consists of ‘consent armoured by 
coercion’: in other words, the routine deployment of coercion 
against particular groups depends on the consensual relationship 
between the state and other groups. ‘Bad’ protestors, in the sense 
of protestors subject to heavy policing and the sudden use of 
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force, are a social category rather than a category representing a 
particular type of behaviour. It is worth reiterating that very few 
demonstrations in Dublin show any propensity to violence or 
rioting; not a single window was broken on May Day 2004.
While the new Irish policing tactics followed international 
models, they could not be successfully applied without a shift in 
the way anti-capitalist protestors were perceived by Irish society. 
Hence the anticipatory coverage of the EU protests, aimed at 
discrediting anti-capitalists and generating a moral panic to justify 
massive policing; hence too the media smear campaign in Erris, 
aimed at delegitimising the community through accusations that 
they were pawns in a subversive plot against the state.
The success of these strategies has been uneven. One suggestion 
is that the tabloid media had to be ‘turned around’ or influenced 
by some agency to change them from their 2002 hostility towards 
police violence to their 2004 crediting of implausible stories 
about the protests.27 The serious media have been somewhat more 
resilient, and have on occasion used this process for an attack on 
tabloid journalism. In the case of Rossport, however, the apparent 
interest of economic and political elites in the transfer of offshore 
wealth to multinationals has seriously constrained both print 
and broadcast media, whether owned by the state or by wealthy 
individuals.
The courts present a similar picture: district courts, in which 
the police are routinely the de facto prosecutors and the only 
witnesses, have on the whole been more receptive to the police 
version of events, whereas higher courts have been willing to crack 
down on serious challenges to state interests but have shown little 
willingness to criminalise ‘ordinary protestors’ on the evidence of 
gardaí alone.
Public opinion, finally, remains contested and contradictory: 
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at one point accepting the use of the navy against a small rural 
community, at another point outraged by the imprisonment of 
members of that same community; willing to provisionally believe 
scare stories about EU protests but also to enjoy serious journalists’ 
demolition of those same stories; less willing to engage in protest 
themselves but more willing to come out to defend the right to 
protest. In this respect, the right to political protest in Dublin 
probably remains better supported than the right of marginalised 
communities to resist development by large business interests.
3. What do police and protestors learn from these 
encounters?
Firstly, the Europeanisation of the policing of protests was part of 
a general ‘professionalisation’ of the gardaí, reflected in tactics like 
borrowing water cannons from the PSNI, using training by the 
London Metropolitan police, collaboration with Interpol in the 
use of spotters and the identification of known activists, the use 
of the military and the militarisation of police functions. At the 
broadest level, of course, it was reflected in the identification of 
anti-capitalists as ‘the new subversives’.
This strategy, however, has met with limited success. There 
were severe constraints on using force of a kind unusual in UK or 
continental protest policing. On the other hand, a media offensive 
relying on police interdependence with crime journalists and local 
socio-historical factors helped to delegitimise protestors’ claims. 
In particular, in the case of Erris, the argument that protestors 
were influenced or infiltrated by republicans and were against 
development (and hence jobs) made this offensive easier.
By contrast, there is little evidence of any improved police 
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strategy in the courts: interdependence between police and judges 
in low-level proceedings continues to produce some convictions, 
but police are still failing to convince senior, or more sceptical, 
judges in higher court appearances. Nor have police efforts at 
public relations proved uniformly effective at influencing ‘serious’ 
media. Rather, political controls – such as the refusal by Radio 
Telefis Éireann to broadcast the AfrI (Action from Ireland) 
advertisement campaign about Erris, or the private ownership of 
much of the Irish media – have meant that silence has been the 
more common ‘serious’ response.
Finally, the apparent outsourcing of state violence to private 
companies in Erris represents a worrying trend, perhaps a response 
to this blockage. Some aspects, such as night-time attacks on 
local campaigners by masked groups, have apparently been too 
sensational for ‘serious’ journalism. Independent media journalists 
have raised questions over IRMS (Integrated Risk management 
Services), a security company which operates in conjunction with 
the gardaí in policing protest and whose staff appear to have very 
dubious records abroad, but again mainstream journalists have 
avoided this story.
Movement activists, for their part, have shifted towards 
disruptive but non-violent protest as an effective strategy in a neo-
liberal context where access to decision-making is increasingly 
constrained. This move is supported by the development of 
independent media sources in place of state and corporate media, 
and the development of solidarity and alliances with other groups 
on a national and transnational level, replacing two decades of 
‘partnership’ politics in which most alliances were at best confined 
to a single sector.
The use of video technology and legal observers, with careful 
documenting of police behaviour, has become important in 
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attempts to limit coercive policing, as has an increased willingness 
to engage with media and courts. An awareness that in such battles 
protestors are sometimes successful also raises the costs (in both 
money and legitimacy) of attempts at repression. Attempts at 
widening the arena have also been significant, such as the use of 
human rights observers, academic and non-academic researchers, 
and the development of trade union and international links.
As in the past, the right to protest – and, when institutions block 
effective democratic control of decisions, the attempt to disrupt 
their normal functioning – remains an inherently contested area. 
What stands out most obviously from this Irish experience is that 
the result is not a foregone conclusion, but depends on the attitude 
of other social groups – themselves internally divided – and the 
learning processes of both police and protestors.
